—Janet Mock, transgender woman and writer, on medical care for transgender people
Because of this, several county jails have good policies regarding clothing and grooming. For example, King County, Washington allows transgender women to order from the commissary and wear the same items, such as bras, as other females at the facility.43 Similarly, Cumberland County, Maine allows transgender men and women to dress, groom, and use names and pronouns that are consistent with their gender identity.44
While it might be very hard for you to get the medical care you need, here are a few things you can do:
- Look for policies about transgender prisoners, including policies about medical care. They may be in the prison law library. If not, you can ask staff for copies or send a public records request for all policies about transgender prisoners.
- If you were receiving hormones from a doctor prior to incarceration, have your medical records sent to the medical or health director at your facility.
- Get a copy of the WPATH Standards of Care to show the prison medical staff, or tell them where to find them (http://www.wpath.org/). Be sure to ask for care in writing, and send a copy to the health director of your prison or jail.
- Even if you are told that denials of medical and mental health care cannot be appealed, file appeals anyway. Try to get a medical staff member to respond to your appeals about care instead of correctional staff. If correctional staff answer your grievance, request at the next level that medical staff respond to your appeal since it involves medical issues.
21. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) ("[Eighth Amendment] principles establish the government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.").
22. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). See also Fennell v. Quintela, 393 F. App'x 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2010); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003); Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). See also Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 248 (D. Mass. 2012) (prison officials deliberately indifferent where they failed to "remove[ ] the risk of serious future harm" stemming from GID); De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[Plaintiff']s need for protection against continued selfmutilation constitutes a serious medical need to which prison officials may not be deliberately indifferent.").
24. See, e.g., Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 831, 832 (7th Cir. 2007) (treatment cannot be "blatantly inappropriate"); Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th Cir. 1998) (medical treatment in prison cannot be such that "no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances"); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (medical care in prison cannot be "so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all").
25. See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We assume for purposes of this appeal that transsexualism constitutes a serious medical need."); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995) (prison officials must provide treatment to address the medical needs of transsexual prisoner); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing transsexualism as a serious medical need that should not be treated differently than any other psychiatric disorder); Phillips v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792, 799 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (complete refusal by prison officials to provide a person with GID with any treatment at all would state an Eighth Amendment claim). Note also that various physical manifestations of GID, such as genital mutilation, are also considered serious medical needs within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.See, e.g., De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634 ("[N]eed for protection against continued self-mutilation [because of GID condition] constitutes a serious medical need.").
26. See, e.g., Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 413 (transgender prisoner has right to some form of treatment, but not to her choice of a "particular type of treatment, such as estrogen therapy"); Briones v. Grannis, CV 09-08074-VAP(VBK), 2010 WL 3636139, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (failure to provide transgender prisoner with the specific type of hormone treatments she requested did not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation).
27. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir. 1991) (treatments cannot be denied merely because they are expensive); Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285 (D.N.H. 2003) (treatment must be "based on medical considerations"); Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 182 (D. Mass. 2002) (treatments cannot be denied merely because they are controversial).
28. See Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting prison security argument because "transgender inmates may be targets for violence even without hormones" and defendants' expert "testified that it would be 'an incredible stretch' to conclude that banning the use of hormones could prevent sexual assaults"); Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 240-41 (D. Mass. 2012).
29. See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 454-55 (1st Cir. 2011); Tates v. Blanas, No. S-00-2539, 2003 WL 23864868, *10 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (officials must balance security risks of providing transgender prisoner with bra against her medical needs); Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 191 ("It has been, and remains, permissible for [prison officials] to consider the security implications of the medical care prescribed for [transgender prisoners]").
30. See Moore v. Duffy, 255 F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[M]edical treatment may so deviate from the applicable standard of care as to evidence a physician's deliberate indifference."); Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (Eighth Amendment violation where treatment represents "such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment"); United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987) (Eighth Amendment guarantees medical care "at a level reasonably commensurate with modern medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional standards"); Barrett, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (D.N.H. 2003) ("'Adequate medical care' requires treatment by qualified medical personnel who provide services that are of a quality acceptable when measured by prudent professional standards in the community, tailored to an inmate's particular medical needs, and that are based on medical considerations."). See also above, n.23.
31. De'Lonta, 708 F.3d at 522-23 (WPATH standards "are the generally accepted protocols for the treatment of GID"); Fields, 653 F.3d at 553-54 (characterizing the WPATH standards as the “accepted standards of care"); Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (same).
32. WPATH, Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People, Version 7 ("Standards of Care"), at 67 ("Access to these medically necessary treatments should not be denied on the basis of institutionalization or housing arrangements.").
33. Standards of Care, at 22-23 (recommended minimum credentials for mental health professionals who work with adults presenting with gender dysphoria); at 8-10 (treatment is individualized to include one or more of psychotherapy, change of gender expression or role, hormone therapy, and surgery, since individual's treatment needs vary).
34. See, e.g., Fields, 653 F.3d at 555 ("Although DOC can provide psychotherapy as well as antipsychotics and antidepressants, defendants failed to present evidence rebutting the testimony that these treatments do nothing to treat the underlying disorder."); cf. Edwards, 478 F.3d at 831 (a prisoner's "receipt of some medical care does not automatically defeat a claim of deliberate indifference if a fact finder could infer the treatment was so 'blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate' a medical condition."); Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006) (prisons cannot simply choose an "easier course of [medical] treatment that they know is ineffective").
35. See De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634-35; Wolfe v. Horn, 130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Phillips, 731 F. Supp. at 800 ("Taking measures which actually reverse the effects of years of healing medical treatment . . . is measurably worse [than failing to provide such treatment in the first place].").
36. See Fields, 653 F.3d at 557-58 (Wisconsin's blanket ban on hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery constituted facial violation of Eighth Amendment); De'Lonta, 330 F.3d at 635 (allegations of denial of treatment based on blanket policy rather than medical judgment sufficient to support claim for deliberate indifference); Allard v. Gomez, 9 F. App'x. 793, 795 (9th Cir. 2001) (deliberate indifference if transgender prisoner was denied hormone therapy as result of blanket rule); Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 250 (blanket prohibition on female canteen items and clothing violates Eighth Amendment); Houston v. Trella, No. 04-CV-1393, 2006 WL 2772748, at *8 (D. N.J. Sept. 25, 2006) (policy of withholding hormone treatment violates Eighth Amendment); Barrett, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 286 ("A blanket policy that prohibits a prison’s medical staff from making a medical determination of an individual inmate’s medical needs and prescribing and providing adequate care to treat those needs violates the Eighth Amendment"); Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 176 (blanket policy that prohibits prison’s medical staff from making medical determination of an individual prisoner’s medical needs violates Eighth Amendment). See also Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1068-70 (9th Cir. 2014) (blanket policy of denying cataract surgery where prisoners had at least one "good eye" violated Eighth Amendment); Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2003) (policy forbidding treatment of keloid scars for purposes of alleviating moderate chronic pain could support deliberate indifference finding); Batterson v. Bannister, No. 3:07-CV-142-BES-VPC, 2008 WL 3871710, at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 19, 2008) (blanket policy prohibiting treatment for chronic pain without individualized assessment of prisoners’ medical needs states Eighth Amendment claim).
37. See Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 313 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated in part on other grounds, 289 F. Supp. 2d 286 (N.D.N.Y 2003) ("[T]here is no exception to [the Eighth Amendment] for serious medical needs that are first diagnosed in prison."); Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 193 (while presumptive freeze frame policy is permissible, ultimate decisions must be made an individualized basis rather than blanket rule); see also Lynch v. Lewis, No. 7:14-CV-24 HL, 2014 WL 1813725, at *2-*3 (M.D. Ga. May 7, 2014) (denial of hormones pursuant to freeze frame policy may violate the Eighth Amendment).
38. Federal Bureau of Prison Program Statement 6031.04 ("Patient Care"), dated June 3, 2014, at 42 (providing that "inmates in the custody of the Bureau with a possible diagnosis of GID will receive a current individualized assessment and evaluation" and that "[t]reatment options will not be precluded solely due to level of services received, or lack of services, prior to incarceration.").
39. See, e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (prison officials may manifest deliberate indifference by "intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care"); Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App’x 907, 911 (11th Cir. 2014) (possible Eighth Amendment violation where transgender prisoner alleged that prison health official knew hormone therapy was medically necessary but nonetheless refused to provide it); De’lonta, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013) (failure to evaluate transgender prisoner for surgery could constitute deliberate indifference); Fields, 653 F.3d at 558-59 (statute that prevented medical personnel from evaluating prisoners with GID for hormone therapy or surgery violated Eighth Amendment); Battista, 645 F.3d at 455 (extreme "composite of delays, poor explanations, missteps, changes in position and rigidities" regarding prisoner’s request for hormone therapy showed deliberate indifference); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2006) (delay of over a year before seeing a hand specialist constituted deliberate indifference); Wallin v. Norman, 317 F.3d 558. 562 (6th Cir. 2003) (delay of one week in treating urinary tract infection and delay of one day in treating serious leg injury could constitute deliberate indifference).
40. See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004) (extended delay in starting Hepatitis C treatment because prisoner might be released within twelve months stated claim under Eighth Amendment).
41. See De’lonta, 708 F.3d at 526 n. 4 (allegation that prisoner had not been evaluated by a GID specialist for surgery stated claim of deliberate indifference); Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 161, 189 (prisoner who was only seen by social worker and psychiatrist who did not have experience diagnosing GID had never received an individualized medical evaluation, since she had not been evaluated by qualified medical staff); see also, e.g., Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 526 (7th Cir. 2008) (refusal to refer to a specialist where doctor did not know cause of reported extreme pain could support deliberate indifference finding); LeMarbe v. Wisneski, 266 F.3d 429, 440 (6th Cir. 2001) (failure to make timely referral to specialist or tell patient to seek one out was deliberate indifference); Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1278-79 (10th Cir. 2001) (prison doctor who reattached accidentally severed finger could be found deliberately indifferent for failing to refer prisoner for specialist care at any point; denial of access to "medical personnel capable of evaluating the need for treatment" and performing surgery one is not qualified for can be deliberate indifference);Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1994) (jury could conclude that prison doctor was deliberately indifferent when he failed to refer prisoner for re-evaluation for surgery to a specialist despite requests for further treatment from the prisoner); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (prison’s refusal to provide specialty consultations from an orthopedic specialist or a psychiatrist without a court order was deliberate indifference).
42. See Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 908-11 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (prison officials’ denial of plaintiff’s requests for makeup, women’s undergarments, and facial hair remover might give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation); Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 246 (prison officials' delay in providing female canteen items and clothing necessary for plaintiff’s GID treatment constituted deliberate indifference). Other legal arguments for right to gender expression in prisons have not been successful. See, e.g., Lopez v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 10321, 2009 WL 229956, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009) (prison officials’ refusal to allow plaintiff to wear women’s clothing did not violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment); Nelson v. Anderson, No. 7:07cv00149, 2007 WL 989980, at *2 (W.D. Va. March 30, 2007) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that prison officials violated his generalized due process rights by forbidding him from drawing his eyebrows in); Powell v. Cusimano, 326 F. Supp. 2d 322, 343 (D. Conn. 2004) (rejecting plaintiff's equal protection claims regarding prison’s prohibition against hair extensions and contact lenses); Star v. Gramley, 815 F. Supp. 276, 278 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting plaintiff's equal protection and free speech/expression claims regarding right to wear makeup and women’s clothing in prison).
43. King County, Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention, Adult Divisions, General Policy Manual, 6.03.007 (April 2, 2014).
44. Cumberland County Sheriff’s Office, Policy and Procedure, Transgender Inmates, No. D-243A (Dec. 2009).
4. Housing and Administrative Segregation
"Soltary confinement is…cruel and unusual punishment that benefits no one, and nothing about it rehabilitates anyone."45
—Dee Dee Webber, transgender woman in NY men’s prison on her four years in solitary confinement
Prisons and jails generally separate prisoners by sex, which they decide based on a prisoner’s external genital characteristics or assigned sex at birth, regardless of their gender identity or presentation. However, the PREA Standards require prisons and jails to make individualized housing and program placements for all transgender and intersex prisoners, including when assigning them to male or female facilities.46 Staff also have to consider housing and program assignments at least twice a year to review any threats to safety experienced by the prisoner and must take into account a prisoner’s own view of his/her safety.47 The PREA Standards also make clear that staff cannot make housing or program placements based solely on a prisoner’s LGBT status.48
Many correctional facilities house transgender prisoners in long-term segregation, claiming they are doing so to protect the prisoners from violence. Prisoners who are placed in administrative segregation are often kept in their cells for nearly 24 hours a day and cannot participate in education, jobs, and other programming. Although staff have a lot of power over the decision to put prisoners in administrative segregation, there are some protections for prisoners. The PREA Standards do not allow staff to place you in administrative segregation against your will unless they have found—within the first 24 hours of involuntary segregation—that there is no other way to keep you safe.49 The PREA Standards also state that you cannot be segregated against your will for more than 30 days, and that prisoners placed in protective custody must be given access to programs, privileges, education, and work opportunities to the extent possible.50
Whether you can be segregated for safety concerns depends on the exact purpose of segregation, the existence of alternatives, the harshness of the conditions, the duration of segregation, and whether the placement in segregation is regularly reviewed.51 Prisons are not supposed to put LGBT prisoners in segregation for long periods of time without regularly and meaningfully considering other, less restrictive places where they can be housed.52
Here are a few things you can do if you do not feel safe in your housing situation:
- If you are placed in segregation and do not want to be there, file an appeal about your placement. You should also appeal anything that seems unfair about your placement, such as not being able to participate in a hearing, not being told why you were moved to segregation, not being able to participate in programming, or not being told when you can get out.
- If your placement is based on so-called safety concerns and you would feel safer in a women’s facility (as a transgender woman), request such a transfer and file appeals if you do not get one.
- As always, appeal all denials as soon as you can and within the time frames required by the grievance process.
45. "Voices from Solitary: Cruel and Unusual Punishment for Transgender Women."
46. See 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(c) ("In deciding whether to assign atransgender or intersex inmate to a facility for male or female inmates, and in making other housing and programming assignments, the agency shall consider on a case-by-case basis whether a placement would ensure the inmate’s health and safety, and whether the placement would present management or security problems.").
47. 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(d), (e).
48. 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(g).
49. 28 C.F.R. § 115.43(a).
50. 28 C.F.R. § 115.43(c), (b).
51. See Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Dept. of Corrections, 473 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2007); Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 416; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978).
52. See Medina-Tejada v. Sacramento County, No. Civ.S-04-138FDC/DAD, 2006 WL 463158, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2006) (transgender prisoners should not be subject to automatic segregation); Tates, 2003 WL 23864868, at *9-10 (same).
5. Searches and Privacy
Transgender prisoners are frequently targeted for excessive, harassing, or public strip searches. Courts have recognized, however, that prisoners have a right to privacy during full body searches.53 Therefore, staff must have a good reason to do strip searches and cannot use them to harass or intimidate prisoners.54
Courts have also held that staff must do strip searches professionally and respectfully even when those searches are legally justified. For example, a strip search conducted in full view of other prisoners and prison staff may violate a prisoner's privacy rights.55 If there is no emergency, courts have also held that male staff should not strip-search women (including transgender women) and that female staff should not strip-search men.56 Additionally, some jails have -policies stating that transgender prisoners are allowed to choose the gender of the staff who will search them.57
The PREA Standards also state that cross-gender strip and pat-down searches should not happen unless there is an emergency (or when performed by a medical practitioner)58 and that staff cannot search or physically examine transgender prisoners solely to determine their genital status.59 Prisons and jails must train staff to perform respectful searches of transgender prisoners.60 Finally, the PREA Standards require that transgender prisoners be given access to private showers if requested.61
Transgender prisoners have a right to privacy and confidentiality regarding their transgender status or sexual orientation. Therefore, prison staff are not generally allowed to publicize or disclose the fact that a prisoner is transgender or gay.62
Here are some general tips regarding searches and privacy:
- If you are asked to strip down in front of other prisoners, politely ask to be moved to a separate area.
- If you cannot use a private shower, ask to be able to shower at a different time than other prisoners or in a private area (as the PREA Standards require).63
- If you do not want to be searched by a staff member of a particular sex, politely ask for a different staff member to search you. You should inform staff that you do not feel safe being searched by staff members of that sex. In some prisons or jails, you may also be able to get a general order or piece of paper (sometimes called a "chrono") that says you should only be searched by women (if you are a transgender woman).
- Ask for your facility's official policy regarding searches. If not provided, it may be available in the law library or can be requested through a public records request.
53. See Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119-20 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that involuntary exposure of one's genitals may be "especially demeaning and humiliating" and holding that prisoners should not be forced to expose themselves unless "reasonably necessary" to do so).
54. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979) (prison strip searches can only be conducted where "significant and legitimate security interests" outweigh "the privacy interests of the inmates"); Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2009) (strip searches cannot be conducted "in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause psychological pain").
55. See Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002) (transgender prisoners have "the right not to be subjected to a humiliating strip search in full view of several (or perhaps many) others unless the procedure is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest") (emphasis in original);Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 418 (forcing transgender prisoner to regularly "strip before guards and other inmates" may violate the Eighth Amendment where "maliciously motivated, unrelated to institutional security, and hence 'totally without penological justification.'") (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
56. See Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1992) (prisoner had valid Fourth Amendment privacy claim where he was strip-searched in front of female prison staff); Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55-57 (D.D.C. 2013) (transgender woman in prison had constitutional right not to be strip-searched by male prison staff).
57. Cumberland County Maine, D-243A, Denver Sheriff Department, Department Order 4005.1, Transgender and Gender-Variant Inmates (June 6, 2012).
58 28 C.F.R. § 115.15(a).
59. 28 C.F.R. § 115.15(a), (e).
60. 28 C.F.R. § 115.15(f).
61. 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(f).
62. See Powell v. Shriver, 175 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1999) (disclosure of fact that prisoner was transgender violated her constitutional right to privacy); see also Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000) (threats to disclose arrestee's sexual orientation violated his constitutional right to privacy).
63. 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(f)